as given that these transformations depend on trade, but for the purposes of constructing a long-run model of the world economy, we are agnostic on why this is the case -whether it is due to technological spillovers from exporting, or to political economy considerations, for example.
In such a model, as each developing country becomes an advanced economy, it further improves the trade opportunities for the remaining developing countries. Thus, for example, if China is transformed into a rich country, a billion more people will live in countries that import toys and a billion fewer will live in countries that export them, opening up opportunities for other countries to fill this niche.
Our approach is similar to that of Lucas (2000) in that we assume that growth prospects improve with the state of the world economy. We assume once a country becomes an advanced economy it never reverts to being a developing one. This one-sided transition implies that the share of advanced countries in the world economy is increasing over time. If population growth were the same in all countries, the model would suggest that the rate at which countries transition to prosperity will itself increase over time.
However; if population growth is substantially higher in developing countries than in advanced ones, the share of the world population living in poor countries may still increase indefinitely. The larger the disparity in population growth the higher the advanced country population (and resulting demand for developing labor) necessary for the economic transformation process to overcome the demographic trend.
In our model, a developing country will only start exporting to advanced economies once all the other developing countries with lower costs have already integrated into the global economy. It is possible that Africa's non-traditional export opportunities may remain somewhat limited as long as labor remains cheap in China and India. But once China and India become advanced economies, they will substantially improve the export opportunities for the remaining developing countries in Africa. In fact, a simple calibration using historical data suggests that, unless substantial demographic changes take place, the long-run prospects for lagging developing regions may hinge on how quickly China and India develop.
The Model
Consider a model with two production technologies: traditional and modern.
Labor is the only input and is inelastically supplied. In the traditional technology, each unit of labor produces one unit of the final consumption good. The modern technology includes two tasks: a simple task (producing intermediate input L) and a complex task (producing intermediate input H). Trade allows these tasks to be performed in different countries. For example, the simple task could be stitching shoes and the complex task could be designing and marketing the shoes, or the simple task could be automobile assembly and the complicated task could be manufacturing automobile components. For simplicity, we will model the process by which the Korea of 1980 transforms into the Korea of today as happening in an instant. Each period, the probability that a developing country becomes advanced is equal to a constant p times the share of its population working in the modern sector. Each country faces an independent realization of this shock. The economic transformation occurs at the country-level and is not internalized by producers nor workers. Thus, modern sector workers in developing countries must be paid at least their opportunity cost in the traditional sector.
The evolution of the world population distribution across rich and poor countries depends not just on the rate at which poor countries become rich but also on relative population growth. Let A γ and D γ denote natural population growth in the advanced and developing countries respectively. We focus on the case where A D γ γ > , which has been true since the early 20th Century. We allow for the possibility that people will migrate from developing to advanced countries, but assume that rich countries restrict annual migration to a proportion i of their population.
Evolution of the World Population
If the modern sector cannot absorb all the labor in developing countries, it will hire them up to the point where the marginal product of their labor is equal to ) 1 
and the proportion of the world population living in advanced countries will decline indefinitely, converging to zero. If the disparity in population growth rates is small, the right-hand-side of (1) Note that the model has considered the world economy as a large collection of small countries, whose evolution could be approximated by a smooth and deterministic process. In the actual world economy there are some large countries whose development could move sizable shares of the world population from poverty to prosperity. As shown in the next section, developments in large countries such as China and India can play a pivotal role in the evolution of the global economy.
While our focus has been on the evolution of the global economy, this setting has some interesting implications for which countries should grow first. In this model even arbitrarily small differences in transaction costs between countries will have strong implications for which developing countries will integrated into the global economy first.
The ordinal rank of these costs will place countries in a development queue. This suggests a non-linear effect for policy changes.
An interesting implication of this queuing effect is that the country-level response to policy improvements can differ substantially from the global-level response. A country 2 Please refer to Chamon and Kremer (2006) for a more detailed characterization of the evolution can benefit greatly from policy improvements that reduce the cost associated with transacting with it, if that improvement moves it to the front of the queue. However, a similar improvement by all developing countries would only translate in a commensurately small improvement for global growth, which is ultimately constrained by the ability of A N to absorb the labor in the developing world. This can explain growth failing to pick-up in the developing world as a whole despite significant improvements in policy over the last decades (such as lower inflation and trade liberalization). Moreover, policy improvements that are not sufficient to get a country to the front of the queue may have only a limited impact on growth, consistent with the example of Ghana. But for countries closer to the front of this queue, the response to policy improvements may be dramatic.
If one were to interpret African countries as laying behind Asian countries on this queue, this would suggest that the former may have limited development opportunities over the short-and medium-term.
A Simple Calibration
We calibrate the model using population and GDP data from Maddison (2003) International Geary-Khamis dollar terms, was higher than one third of that of the leading country, defined as the United Kingdom for 1820-1900, and the United States afterwards.
3 Since the model assumes one-way transitions from developing to advanced, we focus only on economies that permanently cross that threshold (exceptions are made for temporary declines). Please refer to Chamon and Kremer (2006) We estimate
, the rate of transition from developing to advanced economy status, by averaging over the last 50 years in the sample the ratio of the population in the economies that just became advanced to the total population in advanced economies in that year, yielding an estimate of 0.40%. Based on the United Nations population data for 2000-05, we assume natural population growth rates of 0.29% in advanced economies and 1.38% in developing ones, with a net migration into advanced economies of 0.31% of their population. The U.N. Population
Division projects natural population growth rates to continue to decline in both advanced and developing countries, with their gap narrowing but remaining substantial (Figure 2 ).
Net immigration from developing to advanced economies is expected to remain near its current level, accounting for most of the population growth in the latter. Natural population growth in Africa is projected to remain substantially above the developing world's average. would initially decline, but eventually increase over time.
However, that convergence process would be extremely slow and no substantial improvements would take place within a century. More favorable shocks to demographic parameters, a reduction in transaction costs or an increase in p to the same effect could substantially improve the long-run dynamics (Figure 3 ). These scenarios implicitly assumes that the transition rate is the same for China and India and the rest of the developing world. But the prospects for these two countries are arguably much better than those for the average developing country and these exercises may exaggerate the gains in This simple exercise suggests that rapid growth in China and India may be critical for the long run prospects of the rest of the developing world. Their growth should also translate in dramatic terms of trade improvements to the remaining developing countries (for example, rising prices for primary commodities and for labor intensive goods).
Conclusion
A model in which development comes through non-traditional exports suggests that the prospects for developing countries depend on the amount of labor that can be absorbed by the advanced economies This stylized model suggests some concerns about Africa's short-and medium-term growth prospects, as its opportunities for successful integration into the world economy may remain somewhat limited as long as cheap labor remains abundant in countries like China and India. But the very same reasons that suggest some concern over the short-and medium-term allow us to be optimistic about the long-run. Once China and India develop, there will be a very strong demand for the labor in the remaining developing countries. Country characteristics that have lead to poor performances today may well allow for high levels of growth in the future, if and when the world economy reaches a sufficiently advanced stage. However, if population growth remains high in the developing world it may not be possible for all that labor to be absorbed in the global economy.
Our model also has implications for the debate over population growth in the developing world. The old conventional wisdom was that population growth in developing countries was a major problem. The new conventional wisdom is that if the population growth is rapidly declining and hence not a major problem. Our stylized model suggests that even if absolute levels of population growth in developing countries are declining, prospects for development may be negatively affected by persistent high population growth relative to rich countries, which are experiencing their own declines in population growth. The future of the world economy may well be decided by a race between Asian economic growth and African population growth. 
